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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
CHRIS DEAN BENDER, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 15413 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a criminal proceeding in which the appellant, CHRIS 
DEAN BENDER, was charged with the crime of Theft in the Third Degree 
in violation of Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-6-403 (1953 as 
amended). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried by a jury on March 3, 1977, before the 
Honorable James S. Sawaya, and found guilty of Theft in the Third 
Degree. Appellant was sentenced to an indeterminate term as provided 
by law and placed on probation. As terms of that probation, the 
appellant is required to reside at the Community Correction Center 
(Halfway House) until released by that facility. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the conviction and judgment 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
rendered below and a remand of the case to the Third Jud· · . ic1al Dt 
Court for a new trial, or in the alternative, the appellant 
seek; 
reversal of the judgment rendered below and a remand of the 
case 
the Third Judicial District Court with the instructions to enter 
judgment for the lesser included offense of Attempted Theft and, 
impose the appropriate modifications in the sentence. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Francis Hayes, an employee of Chalk Garden, a woman's 
clothing store located in Salt Lake City, testified that on Decec: 
21, 1976, she had just arrived at work when she first noticed t)0 
appellant in one of the Chalk Garden's dressing rooms (T. 3). At 
time, according to Ms. Hayes, the appellant " . . was putting : 
thing in a big paper bag" (T. 5, line 7). On cross-examination, 
clarified that the article, a coat, was actually halfway in and r 
out of the bag when she observed the appellant (T. 13). Ms. Hay< 
had noticed the appellant because the dressing room door was oper. 
usually it is kept closed (T. 7). In fact, she testified that if 
door had been closed, she would have not been suspicious (T. 10). 
After contacting John Bernard, the owner and manager o'. 
Chalk Garden, concerning the appellant, Ms. Hayes returned to th< 
dressing room and found a wooden hanger, normally used for the me 
· h d · (T 7) However, she did not check for po: expensive mere an ise . . 
removed price tags in the room nor did she check the rack where' 
coat had been located for additional hangers (T. 15). There was 
evidence presented which specifically connected the hanger with'. 
coat. d
. d t know wr Additionally, Ms. Hayes testified that she 1 no 
- 2 -
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the coat had been previous to her observation, what had previously 
been in the dressing room, nor when the appellant had arrived at the 
store (T. 9, T. 13). 
John Bernard, upon being contacted by Ms. Hayes, followed 
the appellant from the dressing room to the front counter and register 
area. Mr. Bernard testified: 
. . . there were a couple of sales people behind the 
counter and more than one person at the counter 
purchasing something at the time. He [the appellant] 
stopped and spoke with someone at the counter . . . 
I could not hear what they were saying. I have no 
idea what was mentioned. They did speak to each 
other, and then he turned and walked down here past 
the end of the counter the end of this counter, 
towards the front door. At this point I asked him if 
I could see what he had in the paper sack (T. 20, 
lines 1 - 3, 8 - 12). . . . There was no disagree-
ment in any way (T. 21). 
Mr. Bernard then opened the sack, a ZCMI bag, and removed the coat 
(T. 22). He identified the coat as belonging to the Chalk Garden. 
On cross-examination, Mr. Bernard admitted that the 
"conversation" he said the appellant engaged in at the counter only 
amounted to his hearing the appellant say something to someone without 
hearing or knowing whether any reply was made (T. 29). Additionally, 
Mr. Bernard stated that he stopped the appellant ten to twelve feet 
from the exit while still near the counter area (T. 34). 
Mr. Bender, the appellant, took the stand in his own behalf, 
and testified that he had been resting on a bench in the Chalk Garden 
when he noticed an unknown woman leave the ZCMI bag in the dressing 
room (T. 53 - 54). He opened the sack, partially took out the coat, 
replaced it, and proceeded to the counter area (T. 54 - 55). At the 
counter, he attempted to inform a person he thought was an employee 
about the coat. No response was made (T. 55). Mr. Bender was then 
stopped by Mr. Bernard. 
- 3 -
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The State witnesses agreed that at all times the a 
PPe 
was cooperative, never attempting to leave the store when stoppe· 
nor hostile in giving the bag to Mr. Bernard for inspection (T. 
34). 
The only major factual dispute in the evidence presen: 
concerned statements which Mr. Bernard alleged the appellant maai 
him at the time the appellant was detained (T. 22 - 23). The ai: 
denied these statements (T. 56). Mr. Bernard admitted that heh: 
concluded the appellant was guilty of theft at the time of the st 
and that no statements or explanations of the appellant would ha. 
made a difference to him (T. 45). 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE 
APPELLANT'S PROFFERED JURY INSTRUCTION ON 
THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF ATTEMPTED 
THEFT. 
Appellant was entitled to an instruction on Attemptea 
Theft as a lesser included offense to the charge of Theft. Af~ 
trial, the appellant requested the instruction on the lesser inc'. 
offense 1 and made a timely exception to its exclusion (T. 67), 
1. The appellant's requested instruction stated: 
In the event that you have a reasonable doubt as to.r 
Bender's guilt as to the crime of theft, you may then con~1f; 
whether or not Mr. Bender is guilty of attempted theft, ed 
you would be warranted in convicting Mr. Bender of attemlrw' 
theft, the State must prove each and every one of the fo 0 • 
essential elements of that crime: 1 
1. That on or about December 21 1976 the said CHR1: 
DEAN BENDER did attempt to obtain or ex~rcise 'unauthorized c. 
over the property of the Chalk Garden. . ~ 
2. That he attempted to obtain the property with 
purpose to deprive the said Chalk Garden o~ said prop~rH)o 
3. That said property had a value in excess 0 
- /, - . 
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The importance of instructions on the lesser included 
offenses was noted in State v. Barkas, 91 Utah 574, 65 P.2d 1130 
(1937). The Court stated that the trial court's failure to instruct 
on lesser offenses " . clashes with two fundamental rules of 
trial in criminal cases: It has the effect of the court weighing 
the evidence and, in effect, limiting the jury to a consideration 
of only part of the evidence ... ' and it, in effect, casts upon 
the defendant the burden of proving his innocence or justification." 
Id. at 1132. 
' 
Utah Code Annotated §77-33-6 (1953 as amended) imposes 
the obligation to give the instruction on the lesser included offense, 
providing: 
The jury may find the defendant guilty of any 
offense the commission of which is necessarily 
included in that with which he is charged in 
the indictment or information, or of any attempt 
to comm.it the offense. 
This section recently was interpreted by the Utah Supreme 
Court in State v. Pierre, Supreme Court No. 13903, November 25, 1977, 
where the Court held the statute was subject to the modification of 
less than $1,000.00 lawful money of the United States. 
4. That such acts occurred in Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah. 
Mr. Bender's plea of not guilty thereby casts upon the 
State the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt each and 
all of the foregoing essential elements. Thus, before you can 
convict Mr. Bender of the crime of attempted theft, you must 
find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable do~bt, each and 
every one of the foregoing elements. If iyou find that the . 
evidence has failed to prove any one or more of these essential 
elements to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt, then 
it is your duty to acquit Mr. Bender. 
- 5 -
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... 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-1-402 (4) (1953 as amended), Whi 
states: 
~he co~rt shall not be o~ligated to charge the 
Jury with respect to an included offense unless 
there is a rational basis for a verdict acquittin 
the defendant of the offense charged and convictig 
him of the excluded offense. ng 
In State v. Dougherty, 550 P.2d 175 (1976), the Utahi 
Court defined the situations where instructions on lesser includ, 
offenses are requested and when such instructions must be given, 
matter of law. Citing Lisby v. State, 414 P.2d 592 (Nev., 1966), 
Court stated: 
First, where there is evidence which would absolve 
the defendant from guilt of a greater offense, or 
degree; the instruction is mandatory. 
Second, where the evidence would not support 
a finding of guilt in the commission of the lesser 
offense or degree. For example, the defendant 
denies any complicity in the crime charged, and thus 
lays no foundation for an intermediate verdict; 
or where the elements of the offenses differ, and 
some element essential to the lesser offense is 
either not proved or shown not to exist. This 
second situation renders an instruction on a lesser 
included offense erroneous, because it is not 
pertinent. 
Third, is an intermediate situation. One where 
the elements of the greater offense include all 
the elements of the lesser offense; because, by 
its very nature, the greater offense could not 
have been committed without defendant having the 
intent in doing the acts, which constitute th7 
lesser offense. In such a situation instructions 
on the lesser offense may be given, because all 
elements of the lesser offense have been proved. 
However, such an instruction may properly be 
refused if the prosecution has met its burden of 
proof on the greater offense, and there is no 
evidence tending to reduce the greater offense. 
The court concluded by stating that if there be 
any evidence, however slight, on any reasonable 
theory of the case under which the defendant 
might be convicted of a lesser included offens7, 
the court must, if requested, give an appropriate 
instruction. [550 P.2d at 176] Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Ut h State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The question is whether there is a rational basis upon 
which a lesser included offense could have been submitted to the 
jury. In the instant case, John Bernard testified that he stopped 
the appellant while the appellant was in the store (T.21) and that 
the appellant offered no resistance to Mr. Bernard's inquiries 
and requests (T.33-34). Further, the appellant voluntarily waited 
for Mr. Bernard when Bernard left the store to locate a security 
guard. Because the appellant never left the store with the 
merchandise, appellant believes the case at bar is within the 
first situation discussed by the Court in Dougherty, supra, and 
therefore, entitled him to the instruction on the lesser offense 
as a matter of law. Appellant submits that the second Dougherty 
situation is inapplicable notwithstanding his denial of complicity 
in the crime of theft because appellant admitted his presence in 
the store and his possession of the package. The second Dougherty 
situation is most reasonably read as encompassing those situations 
wherein a defendant denies his presence at the scene of the crime 
or presents an alibi defense. Where the evidence of appellant's 
conduct could be interpreted as exonerating him of the crime of 
theft, there is a rational basis for instructing the jury on the 
lesser included offense of attempted theft. Alternatively, ·appellant's 
case falls within the intermediate situation of Dougherty and the 
State failed to meet its burden of proof, entitling the appellant 
to his requested instruction. Both the appellant's testimony 
concerning his possession of the package and the evidence that he 
-7-
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never left the store with the merchandise would tend to reduce 
the greater offense of theft. 
Appellant submits that the instant case is soundly 
within the purview of Sections 77-33-6 and 76-1-402(4) as 
interpreted by the Court and that it was prejudicial error to 0~: 
the instruction to the jury on the lesser included offense. The 
effect of the Court's failure to instruct the jury on the lesser 
included offense was to contravene the jury's duty to consider 
other verdicts which they might deem more appropriate in the cin 
stances. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT 
THE JURY ON REASONABLE ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESIS 
At the trial, the appellant submitted a proposed jury 
instruction on reasonable alternative hypothesis. 2 The trial 
court refused to so instruct the jury and the appellant made a 
timely exception to the exclusion (T.67). 
2. The appellant's proposed instruction stated: 
To warrant you in convicting the defendant ?f the cf~l 
charged in the complaint, the evidence must, to your minds ex~ t 
every reasonable hypothesis other than. the gu~lt of. the defen a~r 
that is to say, if after a full and fair consideration an? co~~ 
of all the testimony in the case you can reasor,ably explain \ 
facts in evidence on any other reasonable ground other than t e 
guilt of Mr. Bender, then you must acquit him. 
-8-
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The policy behind the reasonable alternative instruction 
to protect the rights of the accused and to emphasize to the jury 
that they must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, based on 
the evidence presented, that the defendant is guilty of the offense 
charged was stated by the Court in State v. Garcia, 11 Utah 2d 67, 
355 P.2d 57 (1960). In Garcia and more recently in State v. Fort, 
Supreme Court No. 15197, December 22, 1977, the Court has held 
this instruction proper only in cases where a necessary element 
of guilt consists of circumstantial evidence. See also State v. 
Dumas, 554 P.2d 1313 (Utah 1976). 
The appellant testified at the trial that.he observed a 
woman leave a package in the dressing room when she left the room 
while he was sitting on a bench in the store (T.53-54). He went 
to the dressing room to retrieve the package and proceeded to the 
front of the store to stop the woman or turn in the package at the 
time he was stopped by the manager (T.54-55). The prosecution's 
evidence substantiates the appellant's version of his actions. 
The salesgirl testified to observing the appellant in the dressing 
room when she first came on duty (T.6). Mr. Bernard testified 
to following the appellant to the front of the store and seeing him 
speaking to someone at the checkout counter (T.19-20). 
At no time did Mr. Bernard nor the security officer attempt to 
elicit an explanation from the appellant. 
Because the State presented no evidence which overtly 
reflected on the appellant's intent, the evidence is subject to 
alternative conclusions, one resulting in a finding of innocence 
-9-
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and the other i·n gui"lt. In thi·s c· t · ircums ance, an instruction 
or reasonable alternative hypothesis which accentuates the State 
burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is appropriate and 
necessary to insure the appellant's right to justice and fairnesi 
POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE 
CONVICTION OF THEFT 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-404 (1953 as amended) provides: 
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises 
unauthorized control over the property of another 
with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
Implicit in the State's burden of proof is the requirement to pre 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant had the intent to 
take the owner's property and deprive him of it. State v. Kazda, 
545 P.2d 190 (Utah, 1976), State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216 (Ut~.r 
In Romero, supra, a prosecution for burglary and theft, the Court 
stated, "The culpable mental state required for [theft] is define 
as a conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or co. 
the result", citing Utah Code Ann. §76-2-103 (1975 Pocket Suppl& 
The Court went on to state: 
This Court has long upheld the standard th~t in an 
appeal from conviction the court cannot weigh 
the evidence nor say what quantum is necessary to 
establish. a fact ~eyon~ a reasona~le doubt so long218 
as the evidence given is substantial [554 P.2d at · 
The State's evidence in the instant case fails to meet the substr 
level delineated by the Court. 
The principal deficiency of the evidence is that the 
heC . 
salesgirl testified that she had just arrived at the store w · 
-10-
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observed the appellant in the dressing room and that no evidence 
was presented which proved or even suggested that the appellant 
took possession of the coat prior to its placement in the ZCMI 
bag. Additionally, the appellant was stopped by the manager when 
he was ten to twelve feet away from the exit and the appellant 
offered no resistance to the manager's inquiries. The evidence 
does not suggest that the appellant sought to conceal the package 
taken from the dressing room. In both respects, the case at bar 
is distinguishable from the facts in State v. Doherty, 29 Utah 2d 
_ 320, 509 P.2d 351 (1973). The defendant in Doherty was charged 
with stealing a gun from a store and the Court held there was a 
sufficient showing of asportation· of the gun without evidence 
showing that the defendant carried it beyond the check stand and 
from the premises. However, in that case the defendant was 
observed near the gun case; a store employee heard the gun case 
open and saw the defendant's companion put a pistol in his pocket 
and leave the store; and the defendant removed a pistol from 
his pocket and placed it on the counter when approached by a store 
employee. 
Unlike Doherty, the instant case is lacking in evidence, 
direct or circumstantial, to prove the appellant's conscious 
objective to cormnit the offense or to prove that he completed the 
offense. The evidence, at best, is sufficient to show the lesser 
included offense of attempted theft and fails to prove a prima 
facie case of theft. Consequently, the Court must reverse the 
judgment of theft. 
-11-
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court comrni tted prejudicial error in refusi· 
to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense and reasona\ 
alternative hypothesis. The evidence of both parties presented, 
rational basis for the inclusion of the instructions and the 
failure to so instruct diminished the normal judicial insurance 
that the verdict be based on a finding of proof beyond a reasonai 
doubt of the offense charged. Further, the State failed to pres< 
a prima facie case of theft by proof of all of the elements and 
the conviction must be reversed for insufficient evidence to 
support the verdict. For the foregoing reasons, the appellant ii 
entitled to a new trial. In the alternative, the Court may 
remand the case to the District Court with the instruction to ent' 
a judgment for the lesser included offense of attempted theft ani 
to impose a new sentence thereon. 
DATED this day of January, 1978. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CHRISTINE FITZGERALD 
Attorney for Appellant 
-12- • 
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